On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information

Achille Basile (), Maria Graziano and Marialaura Pesce

Theory and Decision, 2014, vol. 76, issue 4, 573-599

Abstract: The paper proposes a notion of fairness which overcomes the conflict arising between efficiency and the absence of envy in economies with uncertainty and asymmetrically informed agents. We do it in general economies which include, as particular cases, the main models of differential information economies, providing in this framework a natural competitive equilibrium notion which satisfies the fair criterion. The analysis is conducted allowing the presence of large traders, which may cause the lack of perfect competition. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Envy; Efficiency; Fairness; Mixed markets; Competitive equilibrium; C71; D51; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-013-9386-z (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: On Fairness of Equilibria in Economies with Differential Information (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:76:y:2014:i:4:p:573-599

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-013-9386-z

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().