On Fairness of Equilibria in Economies with Differential Information

Achille Basile (basile@unina.it), Maria Graziano and Marialaura Pesce

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: The paper proposes a notion of fairness which overcomes the conflict arising between efficiency and the absence of envy in economies with uncertainty and asymmetrically informed agents. We do it in general economies which include, as particular cases, the main differential information economies studied in the literature. The analysis is further extended by allowing the presence of large traders, which may cause the lack of perfect competition.

Keywords: Mixed markets; fairness; envy; efficiency; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Published in Theory and Decision, 2014, 76(4), 573-599

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http://www.csef.it/WP/wp303.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:303

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