Condorcet’s principle and the strong no-show paradoxes

Conal Duddy

Theory and Decision, 2014, vol. 77, issue 2, 275-285

Abstract: We consider two no-show paradoxes, in which a voter obtains a preferable outcome by abstaining from a vote. One arises when the casting of a ballot that ranks a candidate in first place causes that candidate to lose the election, superseded by a lower-ranked candidate. The other arises when a ballot that ranks a candidate in last place causes that candidate to win, superseding a higher-ranked candidate. We show that when there are at least four candidates and when voters may express indifference, every voting rule satisfying Condorcet’s principle must generate both of these paradoxes. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Voting; No-show; Paradox; Condorcet; Participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-013-9401-4 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:77:y:2014:i:2:p:275-285

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-013-9401-4

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().