Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes

Conal Duddy

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider two no-show paradoxes, in which a voter obtains a preferable outcome by abstaining from a vote. One arises when the casting of a ballot that ranks a candidate in first causes that candidate to lose the election. The other arises when a ballot that ranks a candidate in last causes that candidate to win. We show that when there are at least four candidates and when voters may express indifference, every voting rule satisfying Condorcet's principle must generate both of these paradoxes.

Keywords: Condorcet; no show; paradox; abstention; voting; participation; positive involvement; negative involvement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41829/1/MPRA_paper_41829.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Condorcet’s principle and the strong no-show paradoxes (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:41527

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