An experimental study on the effect of ambiguity in a coordination game

David Kelsey and Sara Roux ()

Theory and Decision, 2015, vol. 79, issue 4, 667-688

Abstract: We report an experimental test of the influence of ambiguity on behaviour in a coordination game. We study the behaviour of subjects in the presence of ambiguity and attempt to determine whether they prefer to choose an ambiguity-safe option. We find that this strategy, which is not played in either Nash equilibrium or iterated dominance equilibrium, is indeed chosen quite frequently. This provides evidence that ambiguity-aversion influences behaviour in games. While the behaviour of the Row Player is consistent with randomising between her strategies, the Column Player shows a marked preference for avoiding ambiguity and choosing his ambiguity-safe strategy. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Ambiguity; Choquet expected utility; Coordination game; Ellsberg urn; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Working Paper: An Experimental Study on the Effect of Ambiguity in a Coordination Game (2014)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-015-9483-2

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