EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

An Experimental Study on the Effect of Ambiguity in a Coordination Game

David Kelsey and Sara le Roux ()

No 1410, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: We report an experimental test of the influence of ambiguity on behaviour in a coordination game. We study the behaviour of subjects in the presence of ambiguity and attempt to determine whether they prefer to choose an ambiguity safe option. We fi?nd that this strategy, which is not played in either Nash equilibrium or iterated dominance equilibrium, is indeed chosen quite frequently. This provides evidence that ambiguity aversion infl?uences behaviour in games. While the behaviour of the Row Player is consistent with randomising between her strategies, the Column Player shows a marked preference for avoiding ambiguity and choosing his ambiguity-safe strategy.

Keywords: Ambiguity; Choquet expected utility; coordination game; Ellsberg urn, experimental economics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D03 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-upt
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://people.exeter.ac.uk/RePEc/dpapers/DP1410.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: An experimental study on the effect of ambiguity in a coordination game (2015) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:1410

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jingnan (Cecilia) Chen ().

 
Page updated 2020-01-08
Handle: RePEc:exe:wpaper:1410