Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
Mehdi Ayouni () and
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Mehdi Ayouni: Thema, Université de Cergy-Pontoise
Theory and Decision, 2017, vol. 82, issue 3, 327-339
Abstract This article shows that if an allocation rule can be implemented with unlimited information certification, then it can also be implemented with limited information certification if the designer can use ambiguous communication mechanisms, and if agents are averse to ambiguity in the sense of maxmin expected utility. The reverse implication is true if there is a single agent and a worst outcome.
Keywords: Ambiguity; Certifiable information; Evidence disclosure; Mechanism design; Maxmin expected utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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