Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
Mehdi Ayouni and
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Mehdi Ayouni: THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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This article shows that if an allocation rule can be implemented with unlimited information certification, then it can also be implemented with limited information certification if the designer can use ambiguous communication mechanisms, and if agents are averse to ambiguity in the sense of maxmin expected utility. The reverse implication is true if there is a single agent and a worst outcome.
Keywords: Ambiguity; Certifiable information; Evidence disclosure; Mechanism design; Maxmin expected utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Theory and Decision, Springer Verlag, 2017, 82 (3), pp.327-339. 〈10.1007/s11238-016-9575-7〉
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Journal Article: Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01503765
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