Coordination when there are restricted and unrestricted options

Shaun Hargreaves Heap, David Rojo Arjona and Robert Sugden

Theory and Decision, 2017, vol. 83, issue 1, No 6, 107-129

Abstract: Abstract One might expect that, in pure coordination games, coordination would become less frequent as the number of options increases. Contrary to this expectation, we report an experiment which found more frequent coordination when the option set was unrestricted than when it was restricted. To try to explain this result, we develop a method for eliciting the general rules that subjects use to identify salient options in restricted and unrestricted sets. We find that each such rule, if used by all subjects, would generate greater coordination in restricted sets. However, subjects tend to apply different rules to restricted and unrestricted sets.

Keywords: Coordination; Salience; Focal points; Odd-one-out; Typicality; Prototypicality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-017-9589-9

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