Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell
Rabah Amir (),
Sergei Belkov and
Igor V. Evstigneev ()
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Igor V. Evstigneev: University of Manchester
Theory and Decision, 2017, vol. 83, issue 4, No 1, 457-468
Abstract:
Abstract We analyze the concept of correlated equilibrium in the framework of two-player two-strategy games. This simple framework makes it possible to clearly demonstrate the characteristic features of this concept. We develop an intuitive and easily memorizable test for equilibrium conditions and provide a complete classification of symmetric correlated equilibria in symmetric games.
Keywords: Games with communication; Correlated strategies; Correlated equilibrium; 2 $$\times $$ × 2 games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:83:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-017-9609-9
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-017-9609-9
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