Correlated Equilibrium in a Nutshell

Rabah Amir (), Sergei Belkov and Igor V. Evstigneev

Economics Discussion Paper Series from Economics, The University of Manchester

Abstract: We analyze the concept of correlated equilibrium in the framework of two-player two-strategy games. This simple framework makes it possible to clearly demonstrate the characteristic features of this concept. We develop an intuitive and easily memorizable test for equilibrium conditions and provide a complete classification of symmetric correlated equilibria in symmetric games.

JEL-codes: A23 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/schools/soss/eco ... npapers/EDP-1706.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:man:sespap:1706

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Discussion Paper Series from Economics, The University of Manchester Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Patrick Macnamara ().