Procedural and optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value

Dongshuang Hou, Aymeric Lardon, Panfei Sun and Hao Sun
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Dongshuang Hou: Northwestern Polytechnical University
Panfei Sun: Northwestern Polytechnical University
Hao Sun: Northwestern Polytechnical University

Theory and Decision, 2019, vol. 87, issue 2, No 3, 182 pages

Abstract: Abstract The main purpose of this article is to introduce the weighted ENSC value for cooperative transferable utility games which takes into account players’ selfishness about the payoff allocations. Similar to Shapley’s idea of a one-by-one formation of the grand coalition [Shapley (1953)], we first provide a procedural implementation of the weighted ENSC value depending on players’ selfishness as well as their marginal contributions to the grand coalition. Second, in the spirit of the nucleolus [Schmeidler (1969)], we prove that the weighted ENSC value is obtained by lexicographically minimizing a complaint vector associated with a new complaint criterion relying on players’ selfishness.

Keywords: TU-game; Weighted ENSC value; Allocation scenario; Selfish complaint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Procedural and Optimization Implementation of the Weighted ENSC Value (2018)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-019-09697-5

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