Procedural and Optimization Implementation of the Weighted ENSC Value

Dongshuang Hou, Aymeric Lardon, Panfei Sun and Hao Sun
Additional contact information
Dongshuang Hou: Department of Applied Mathematics, Northwestern Polytechnical University
Panfei Sun: Department of Applied Mathematics, Northwestern Polytechnical University
Hao Sun: Department of Applied Mathematics, Northwestern Polytechnical University

No 2018-20, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: The main purpose of this article is to introduce the weighted ENSC value for cooperative transferable utility games which takes into account players' selfishness about the payoff allocations. Similarly to Shapley's idea of a one-by-one formation of the grand coalition (Shapley, 1953), we first provide a procedural implementation of the weighted ENSC value depending on players' selfishness as well as their marginal contributions to the grand coalition. Second, in the spirit of the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969), we prove that the weighted ENSC value is obtained by lexicographically minimizing a complaint vector associated with a new complaint criterion relying on players' selfishness.

Keywords: TU-game; weighted ENSC value; allocation scenario; selissh complaint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2018-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://195.220.190.85/GREDEG-WP-2018-20.pdf First version, 2018 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Procedural and optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2018-20

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