Responding to (un)reasonable requests by an authority

Vittorio Pelligra, Tommaso Reggiani (reggianit@cardiff.ac.uk) and Daniel Zizzo

Theory and Decision, 2020, vol. 89, issue 3, No 2, 287-311

Abstract: Abstract We consider the notions of static and dynamic reasonableness of requests by an authority in a trust game experiment. The authority, modeled as the experimenter, systematically varies the experimental norm of what is expected from trustees to return to trustors, both in terms of the level of each request and in terms of the sequence of the requests. Static reasonableness matters in a self-biased way, in the sense that low requests justify returning less, but high requests tend to be ignored. Dynamic reasonableness also matters, in the sense that, if requests keep increasing, trustees return less compared to the same requests presented in random or decreasing order. Requests never systematically increase trustworthiness but may decrease it.

Keywords: Trust; Trustworthiness; Authority; Reasonableness; Moral wiggle room; Oral licensing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 D03 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Responding to (Un)Reasonable Requests by an Authority (2023)
Working Paper: Responding to (Un)Reasonable Requests by an Authority (2020)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-020-09758-0

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