Responding to (Un)Reasonable Requests by an Authority

Vittorio Pelligra, Tommaso Reggiani () and Daniel Zizzo

No E2020/7, Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section

Abstract: We consider the notions of static and dynamic reasonableness of requests by an authority in a trust game experiment. The authority, modelled as the experimenter, systematically varies the experimental norm of what is expected from trustees to return to trustors, both in terms of the level of each request and in terms of the sequence of the requests. Static reasonableness matters in a self-biased way, in the sense that low requests justify returning less, but high requests tend to be ignored. Dynamic reasonableness also matters, in the sense that, if requests keep increasing, trustees return less compared to the same requests presented in random or decreasing order. Requests never systematically increase trustworthiness but may decrease it.

Keywords: trust; trustworthiness; authority; reasonableness; moral wiggle room; moral licensing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 D03 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://carbsecon.com/wp/E2020_7.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Responding to (Un)Reasonable Requests by an Authority (2023)
Journal Article: Responding to (un)reasonable requests by an authority (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2020/7

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Yongdeng Xu ().