Strategic Debt Management within the Stability and Growth Pact

Gernot Sieg and Stegemann Ulrike ()
Additional contact information
Stegemann Ulrike: Technische Universität Braunschweig, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, D-38106 Braunschweig

Review of Economics, 2010, vol. 61, issue 3, 225-240

Abstract: Opportunistic politicians use the composition of public debt as a signal for competence. A competent government will not issue long-term nominal debt, as optimal to balance the budget, but long-term inflation-indexed debt. We consider politicians that pursue the objective of a balanced budget subject to the Stability and Growth Pact and reelection. A government’s competence is reflected by its ability to produce a public service at a lower cost (taxes). Competence is private information of politicians.

Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2010-0302 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic debt management within the stability and growth pact (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lus:reveco:v:61:y:2010:i:3:p:225-240

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/roe/html

DOI: 10.1515/roe-2010-0302

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Economics is currently edited by Michael Berlemann

More articles in Review of Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().