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Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts

Frederic Mishkin () and Niklas Westelius ()

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2008, vol. 40, issue 4, 557-582

Abstract: In this paper we provide a theoretical treatment of how inflation target ranges cope with the time-inconsistency problem arising from incentives for the monetary policymaker to exploit the short-run trade-off between employment and inflation to pursue short-run employment objectives, as in a Barro-Gordon (1983) model. Inflation band targets are able to achieve many of the benefits that arise under practically less attractive solutions such as the conservative central banker and optimal inflation contracts. Our theoretical model also shows how an inflation targeting range should be set and how it should respond to changes in the nature of shocks to the economy. Copyright (c) 2008 The Ohio State University.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts (2006) Downloads
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