Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts

Frederic Mishkin and Niklas Westelius

No 12384, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this paper we examine how target ranges work in the context of a Barro-Gordon (1983) type model, in which the time-inconsistency problem stems from political pressures from the government. We show that target ranges turn out to be an excellent way to cope with the time-inconsistency problem, and achieve many of the benefits that arise under practically less attractive solutions such as the conservative central banker and optimal inflation contracts. Our theoretical model also shows how an inflation targeting range should be set and how it should respond to changes in the nature of shocks to the economy.

JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
Note: EFG ME
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published as Frederic S. Mishkin & Niklas J. Westelius, 2008. "Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(4), pages 557-582, 06.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts (2008)
Journal Article: Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts (2008)
Working Paper: Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts (2006)
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