IMF Programs and Financial Liberalization in Turkey

Ayse Y. Evrensel

Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 2004, vol. 40, issue 4, 5-19

Abstract: By examining the Fund's views about macroeconomic stability, the effectiveness of IMF-supported stabilization programs, and Turkey's macroeconomic policies, this paper demonstrates that both the IMF and Turkey share the responsibility for the outcome of stabilization programs. The main conclusion of the paper is that the primary targets of stabilization programs are not implemented during the program years. Even though program years are associated with improvements in balance of payments and reserves, such improvements disappear during the post-program years. The fact that Turkey has received subsequent programs from the IMF despite the overall lack of implementation of the Fund's conditionality may be consistent with the existence of moral hazard. In fact, the results suggest that, on average, Turkey enters the next program in worse macroeconomic condition than the previous program.

Keywords: IMF; moral hazard; stabilization program; Turkey (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://mesharpe.metapress.com/link.asp?target=contribution&id=9KG7TERVYVBXU9UC (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:emfitr:v:40:y:2004:i:4:p:5-19

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/MREE20

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Emerging Markets Finance and Trade from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().