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Institutional Reforms, EU Accession, and Bank Efficiency in Transition Economies: Evidence from Bulgaria

Kiril Tochkov () and Nikolay Nenovsky ()

Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 2011, vol. 47, issue 1, 113-129

Abstract: This paper examines the efficiency of Bulgarian banks and its determinants over the period 1999-2007. The levels of technical, allocative, and cost efficiency are estimated using a nonparametric methodology and then regressed on a number of bankspecific, institutional, and EU-related factors. The findings indicate that foreign banks were more efficient than domestic private banks, although the gap between them narrowed over time. State-owned banks ranked last, but their privatization resulted in efficiency gains. Capitalization, liquidity, and enterprise restructuring enhanced bank efficiency, whereas banking reforms had an adverse effect. The Treaty of Accession and EU membership were associated with significant efficiency improvements.

Keywords: banking; efficiency; EU accession; transition economies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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