The Relationship Between Equity-Based Compensation and Managerial Risk Taking: Evidence from China
Yi-Ting Huang,
Ming-Cheng Wu and
Szu-Lang Liao
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 2013, vol. 49, issue S2, 107-125
Abstract:
The authors analyze the impact of equity-based compensation on managerial risk-taking behavior in Chinese listed firms from January 2006 to July 2011. They find that greater risk-taking incentives lead executives to invest more in research and development (R&D) projects and less in capital expenditures. Greater managerial risk-taking incentive increases firm focus. Managerial risk-taking incentives have positive effects on firms' leverage. Overall, increasing the sensitivity of chief executive officers' portfolio value to stock return volatility helps incentivize executives to work harder, as sharing gains and losses with shareholders aligns the interests of executives and shareholders. In addition, the results indicate that state control of firms has a negative effect on R&D investment, and this suggests that state-controlled firms should take more initiative to innovate.
Keywords: CEO incentive; managerial risk taking; R&D investment; stock options (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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