Dynamic Career Incentive Versus Policy Rent-Seeking in Institutionalized Authoritarian Regimes: Testing a Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination in China

Hans Hanpu Tung

Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 2014, vol. 50, issue S6, 51-68

Abstract: In this paper, I study the effect of political elites’ career incentives on China’s trade policy formation. I propose a theoretical dynamic view in which China’s authoritarian leaders can preempt protectionist actions of their selectorate (bureaucrats) by offering them future promotion opportunities within the authoritarian hierarchy as long as the leaders can credibly commit to these political promises. Drawing on a database of China’s sectors for 1999–2007, the empirical results support the dynamic perspective that while political organization still matters for China’s trade policy outcomes, it is less likely for a sector with a higher promotion expectation score to get politically organized.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/1540496X.2014.1013848

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