Does Governance Efficiency Affect Equity Agency Costs? Evidence from Borsa Istanbul

Guler Aras and Ozlem Kutlu Furtuna

Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 2015, vol. 51, issue S2, S84-S100

Abstract: In this article, we investigate whether the governance efficiency variables mitigate the costs arising from agency problems for companies listed on the Borsa Istanbul (BIST). The empirical analyses are conducted on nonfinancial firms during the 2005–11 period. Four models have been implemented for each of the agency-cost proxies, and all of them are estimated by panel data regressions with fixed effects. This study provides evidence from an emerging market about which governance variables and control variables differently reduce the extent of conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. The findings also indicate that highly concentrated firms in Turkey are more engaged with agency problems and do not effectively control excessive perquisite consumption and facilitate asset utilization.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/1540496X.2014.998944 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:emfitr:v:51:y:2015:i:s2:p:s84-s100

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/MREE20

DOI: 10.1080/1540496X.2014.998944

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Emerging Markets Finance and Trade from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().