Idiosyncratic Risk and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Jordan

Diana Abu-Ghunmi, Adel Bino and Mohammad Tayeh

Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 2015, vol. 51, issue S4, S40-S50

Abstract: This article offers evidence in support of the hypothesis that when investors have weak protection, small investors can suffer expropriation by large shareholders. In this kind of situation, a stock’s idiosyncratic risk is found to be negatively related to ownership concentration, which indicates that the cost of controlling ownership may outweigh its benefits. This is consistent with the view that minority investors have less incentive to invest in companies with weak protection for investors. When this is accompanied by low-quality information disclosed to the public, private information is not likely to be reflected in stock prices, resulting in lower idiosyncratic risk.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:emfitr:v:51:y:2015:i:s4:p:s40-s50

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DOI: 10.1080/1540496X.2015.1026717

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