Shareholder Protection, Ownership, and Dividends: Russian Evidence

Eva Liljeblom and Benjamin Maury

Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 2016, vol. 52, issue 10, 2414-2433

Abstract: This article investigates the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and dividend policy in Russian firms. Using a sample of Russian listed firms over the period 1998–2003, we estimate models for dividend pay probability and payout size. We find that there has been a significant increase in dividend payout levels which coincide with improvements in legal shareholder protection. State controlled firms are more frequent dividend payers as compared to other majority owned firms. We also find that dual share firms, in which corporate charters protect minority interests, have a higher dividend pay probability; while firms reporting according to US GAAP, which may be less likely to manipulate earnings, have a lower dividend payout.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/1540496X.2015.1073991

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