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The Impact of IFRS Adoption and Corporate Governance Principles on Transparency and Disclosure: The Case of Borsa Istanbul

Mine Aksu and Hassan Espahbodi

Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 2016, vol. 52, issue 4, 1013-1028

Abstract: This article investigates whether mandatory and voluntary regulation and best governance practices enhance disclosure quality in an emerging market where code law tradition, dominant family ownership, and lax rules and implementation make it less likely for disclosure quality effects to be observed. We show that the Transparency & Disclosure (T&D) scores have improved for a sample of Borsa Istanbul (BIST) firms, and the firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS during 2003 and 2004 have significantly higher scores. However, in 2005, the year IFRS became mandatory, the T&D scores for mandatory and voluntary adopters were no longer significantly different. Multivariate analysis shows that the Corporate Governance (CG) principles and voluntary and mandatory adoptions of IFRS have all had significant positive effects on various T&D scores of the sample firms.

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1080/1540496X.2014.998570

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