Effects of Director and Officer Liability Insurance Coverage on Information Disclosure Quality and Corporate Fraud

Cheng-Hwai Liou, Jo-Lan Liu, Pu-Ming Jian and Ching-Chieh Tsai

Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 2017, vol. 53, issue 4, 806-818

Abstract: We empirically test the monitoring role of director and officer (D&O) insurance coverage by investigating the association between D&O insurance coverage and the information disclosure quality and incidence of corporate fraud for firms listed in Taiwan. The empirical evidence reveals that a firm may raise the quality of information disclosure by purchasing D&O insurance. However, the empirical results do not support the monitoring effect of D&O insurance coverage on corporate fraud.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:emfitr:v:53:y:2017:i:4:p:806-818

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DOI: 10.1080/1540496X.2016.1141647

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