Official Turnover, Political Connections and Enterprise Subsidies: Evidence from China

Li Ji and Wei Zhang

Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 2024, vol. 60, issue 2, 282-291

Abstract: This paper investigates the role of political connections in Chinese industrial enterprises receiving government fiscal subsidies. Using data on local officials and enterprises in China, we empirically examine how changes in political connections – due to turnover of key local government officials – impact enterprise subsidies. We find that enterprise subsidies decrease significantly in the year when local officials’ turnover. However, subsidies change less significantly when the local party secretary is promoted locally or has greater incentives for promotion. The impact of changing political connections is greater for non-state-owned enterprises and large-scale enterprises. Our research helps understand the dynamics between local governments and markets in China. It also has important implications for regulating how subsidies are distributed.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/1540496X.2023.2218962 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:emfitr:v:60:y:2024:i:2:p:282-291

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/MREE20

DOI: 10.1080/1540496X.2023.2218962

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Emerging Markets Finance and Trade from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().