Fact-Finding Based on Economic Circumstantial Evidence: Applying Economic Analysis to the Exchange of Information and Conjectured Bid-Rigging Mechanisms

Koki Arai

Japanese Economy, 2008, vol. 35, issue 3, 3-33

Abstract: This article surveys the use of economic analysis in Japanese antimonopoly cases in comparison with the use of circumstantial evidence in criminal code cases. It introduces the economic thinking to be applied in uncovering secret collusive schemes, especially in proving the exchange of information.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:jpneco:v:35:y:2008:i:3:p:3-33

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DOI: 10.2753/JES1097-203X350301

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