A labor-adverse selection model of reducing working time

Chung-Cheng Lin and Yang C.c

Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 2003, vol. 25, issue 3, 515-524

Abstract: This paper proposes a labor-adverse selection model where labor quality within an individual firm negatively depends upon the average working hours in the market. Under this setting, labor quality is a "pure public good" by nature, and the free market equilibrium will result in inefficient allocation with underprovision. We show that shorter workweek regulations will increase the provision of the public good (labor quality), and the higher labor quality will increase firms' profits and employment. Shorter workweek regulations may therefore increase the firms' profits as well as the workers' employment and bring about a Pareto improvement.

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/01603477.2003.11051362 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:postke:v:25:y:2003:i:3:p:515-524

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/MPKE20

DOI: 10.1080/01603477.2003.11051362

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Post Keynesian Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().