Decentralized versus centralized collective bargaining: is the collective bargaining structure in Spain efficient?

Jesus Ferreiro ()

Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 2004, vol. 26, issue 4, 695-728

Abstract: Recently, a number of proposals have claimed a decentralization of the collective bargaining structure in Spain. These proposals start from the premise that the current procedures for collective bargaining are inefficient, given the predominance of intermediate-level collective bargaining, leading to persistently bad outcomes in terms of inflation and unemployment. This paper tests the validity of these proposals, analyzing whether, first, the coverage and, second, the collective bargaining structure in Spain are a determinant factor of the rates of unemployment and inflation.

Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/01603477.2004.11051421 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:postke:v:26:y:2004:i:4:p:695-728

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/MPKE20

DOI: 10.1080/01603477.2004.11051421

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Post Keynesian Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().