What is wrong with public choice

Steven Pressman

Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 2004, vol. 27, issue 1, 3-18

Abstract: Three problems plague the public choice perspective. First, it cannot explain why people vote, changes in voting behavior, or the actual votes of people. Second, public choice cannot predict the behavior of politicians. It cannot help us understand the sorts of people who run for public office, why candidates run for office promising less government, nor help us understand the actual votes cast by elected politicians. Finally, evidence about the growth of government runs counter to the claims of the public choice school. The paper concludes with some suggestions about how and why public choice has gone wrong.

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1080/01603477.2004.11051423

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