Shareholder value orientation and the investment-profit puzzle

Engelbert Stockhammer

Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 2005, vol. 28, issue 2, 193-215

Abstract: Shareholders have increased their ability to influence management decisions significantly over the past two decades. This paper proposes an extension of the Post Keynesian theory of the firm proposed by Lavoie (1992) to analyze the effects of this change in shareholder power on investment decisions. This microeconomic analysis is complemented by a Kaleckian macroeconomic model. Shareholder power is found to reduce investment and output, while increasing profits, which is consistent with the stylized facts of the neoliberal era.

Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:postke:v:28:y:2005:i:2:p:193-215

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DOI: 10.2753/PKE0160-3477280203

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