Endogenous doctrine, or, why is monetary policy in America so much better than in Europe?

James K. Galbraith

Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 2006, vol. 28, issue 3, 423-432

Abstract: This paper briefly examines the evolution of economic doctrine used to justify monetary policies at the Federal Reserve since World War II. The main finding is that while individual doctrines rarely withstand close scrutiny, they do change with some regularity and in evident response to circumstance. The ability to shift the public face (and perhaps the private basis) of monetary decision making gives the Federal Reserve, for all its faults, an advantage over the European Central Bank, which is constitutionally committed to its "line"--and therefore unable to accommodate itself to new evidence, new theory, or new states of the world.

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.2753/PKE0160-3477280303

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