Is money a convention and/or a creature of the state? the convention of acceptability, the state, contracts, and taxes
David Dequech
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 2013, vol. 36, issue 2, 251-274
Abstract:
This article begins by presenting the idea of money as a convention, first in the economics of conventions and then in post Keynesian economics, also examining whether and how one can reconcile money as a convention with Keynes's essential properties of money. The article then considers the view of money as a creature of the state, in two versions, which connect money to contracts or to taxes, respectively. Finally, it further explores the monetary foundations of a market economy, the conventional foundation of money, and the role of the state. Acknowledging that money is ultimately or fundamentally a convention requires recognizing limits to the state's ability to impose its money on the private agents. At the same time, the state is usually in a much better position than any private agent to influence the process through which the convention of acceptability of money emerges and is reproduced. A stronger proposition is that without state money there would be no stable money in a market economy. Both the fundamental conventionality of money and the essential role of the state can be thus emphasized.
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:postke:v:36:y:2013:i:2:p:251-274
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DOI: 10.2753/PKE0160-3477360204
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