Tax Morale and the Role of Social Norms and Reciprocity - Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment

Philipp Doerrenberg and Andreas Peichl

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 2022, vol. 78, issue 1-2, 44-86

Abstract: We present the results of a survey (with randomized components) on tax compliance. The experimental component of our survey allows us to investigate the role of social norms and reciprocity for tax morale. We find that a social-norm treatment reduces tax morale, while a reciprocity treatment has a positive effect. This suggests that a potential backfire effect of social norms is outweighed if the consequences of violating the social norm are made salient in an appeal to reciprocity. We further document the anatomy of tax morale and present novel evidence about the role of risk and patience for tax morale.

Keywords: tax compliance; tax morale; social norms; reciprocity; survey experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 H20 H32 H50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Tax Morale and the Role of Social Norms and Reciprocity. Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment (2018)
Working Paper: Tax Morale and the Role of Social Norms and Reciprocity: Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment (2018)
Working Paper: Tax morale and the role of social norms and reciprocity - Evidence from a randomized survey experiment (2017)
Working Paper: Tax morale and the role of social norms and reciprocity: Evidence from a randomized survey experiment (2017)
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DOI: 10.1628/fa-2021-0016

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