Tax Morale and the Role of Social Norms and Reciprocity: Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment
Philipp Doerrenberg and
Andreas Peichl ()
No 11714, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
We present the first randomized survey experiment in the context of tax compliance to assess the role of social norms and reciprocity for intrinsic tax morale. We find that participants in a social-norm treatment have lower tax morale relative to a control group while participants in a reciprocity treatment have significantly higher tax morale than those in the social-norm group. This suggests that a potential backfire effect of social norms is outweighed if the consequences of violating the social norm are made salient. We further document the anatomy of intrinsic motivations for tax compliance and present first evidence that previously found gender effects in tax morale are not driven by differences in risk preferences.
Keywords: tax compliance; tax evasion; intrinsic motivations; tax morale; social norms; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H32 H50 C93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-iue, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Tax Morale and the Role of Social Norms and Reciprocity. Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment (2018)
Working Paper: Tax morale and the role of social norms and reciprocity - Evidence from a randomized survey experiment (2017)
Working Paper: Tax morale and the role of social norms and reciprocity: Evidence from a randomized survey experiment (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11714
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().