When and Why Individuals Obey Form-Adhesive Contracts: Experimental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance

Shyam Sunder

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2012, vol. 168, issue 1, 147-149

Date: 2012
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Journal Article: When and Why Individuals Obey Form-Adhesive Contracts: Experimental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance (2012)
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DOI: 10.1628/093245612799440078

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