Social Norm and Giving with Indivisibility of Money: An Experiment on Selfishness, Equity, and Generosity

Te Bao and Xiaohua Yu

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2019, vol. 175, issue 2, 272-290

Abstract: We study a dictator game considering selfishness, equity, and generosity. The dictators first indicate their willingness to give on a decision form and then allocate 10 yuan cash to the receiver in an envelope. The cash consists of 10 banknotes of1 yuan in treatment 1 (high divisibility) and 2 banknotes of 5 yuan in treatment 2(low divisibility). Treatment 2 only has three choices of giving .0;5;10/.30%of individuals take ceilings or floors rather than the standard rounding in treatment 2. However, the individual roundup and rounddown behaviors cancel each other at the aggregate level.

Keywords: dictator game; social norm; divisibility of money; selfishness; equity; generosity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 E03 M59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1628/jite-2019-0020

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