Decreasing Returns, Patent Licensing, and Price-Reducing Taxes
Debapriya Sen and
Giorgos Stamatopoulos ()
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2019, vol. 175, issue 2, 291-307
This paper proposes simple tax policies that can alleviate the distortive effectsof royalties. We consider a Cournot duopoly under decreasing returns where oneof the firms has a patented technology that it can license to its rival using combinations of royalties and fixed fees. Under optimal licensing policies for the patentee, stronger diseconomies of scale result in lower market prices. It is possible to construct tax-transfer schemes for the firms that are Pareto-improving as well as deficit-neutral, i.e., these taxes lower market prices and collect sufficient revenue to compensate firms for their losses from taxation without incurring any deficit.
Keywords: decreasing returns; royalty; quantity tax; deficit neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 D45 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Decreasing returns, patent licensing and price-reducing taxes (2013)
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