On the Importance of Relative Payoffs in Two-Sided Matching

Ernan Haruvy

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2019, vol. 175, issue 1, 58-85

Abstract: In a series of laboratory experiments, small groups of individuals who find themselves in an unequal pairwise-stable outcome tacitly form coalitions on one sideof the market to protect or reject that outcome. The contribution of this work isin showing that relative payoffs play a role in two-sided matching markets; thatin the lab, a same-side blocking coalition can form; and that the matching prescribed by deferred acceptance, by virtue of being highly asymmetric, may not survive same-side blocking coalitions.

Keywords: market design; matching theory; laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1628/jite-2019-0026

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