Noncooperative and Cooperative Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility

Kosuke Hirose, Sang-Ho Lee and Toshihiro Matsumura

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2020, vol. 176, issue 3, 549-571

Abstract: We formulate several quantity and price competition models that investigate the adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) by firms competing in the market. First, we consider emission cap commitments. Under quantity competition, ECSR is adopted by joint-profit-maximizing industry associations because of its effect of weakening quantity competition. However, it is not adopted without industry associations. By contrast, under price competition, individual firms voluntarily adopt ECSR without the industry associations and they choose a higher level of ECSR with the industry associations. Second, we consider emission intensity commitments (commitment to per-output emissions) and find that it is less likely to restrict market competition.

Keywords: corporate social responsibility; anticompetitive effect; emission cap; emission intensity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 M14 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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DOI: 10.1628/jite-2020-0035

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