Endowment Effects in Proposal Rights Contests

Youjin Hahn, Chulyoung Kim and Sang-Hyun Kim

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2021, vol. 177, issue 4, 449-476

Abstract: We experimentally investigate a two-stage game where players compete to be recognized as a proposer in the first stage and play an ultimatum bargaining game in the second stage. We introduce a treatment regarding whether one of the subjects is framed to have proposal rights (without any material advantage) in the beginning of the game. We found that subjects who were framed to be "incumbents" spent significantly more resources to keep their proposal rights than others. We also present and analyze additional behavioral patterns observed in our proposal rights contest experiment.

Keywords: proposal rights; endowment effect; framing effect; contest; ultimatum game; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Endowment Effects in Proposal Right Contest (2019)
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DOI: 10.1628/jite-2021-0018

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