A Duopoly of Strategic CSR Firms

Kojun Hamada and Kojun Hamada
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kojun Hamada

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2022, vol. 178, issue 3, 258-279

Abstract: This study examines a Cournot duopoly when corporate social responsibility (CSR) firms endogenize the degree of commitment on consumer surplus. We establish the following results. First, when a CSR firm competes with a profitmaximizing firm, the Stackelberg equilibriumwhereby the CSR firm is the leader is realized. Second, when two CSR firms compete, firm profit is lower and social welfare is higher than profit maximization. Furthermore, considering the linear demand and quadratic cost functions, we derive the equilibrium in duopoly and compare firm profit and social welfare under different duopolies.

Keywords: corporate social responsibility; mixed duopoly; constraint profit maximization; welfare comparison; corporatesocialresponsibility; mixedduopoly; constraintprofitmaximization; welfarecomparison (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1628/jite-2022-0012

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