Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts Redux

Jonathan Thomas and Timothy Worrall

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2023, vol. 179, issue 3-4, 441-469

Abstract: This paper provides our reflections on self-enforcing wage contracts.We present a simple version of the model of Thomas and Worrall (1988) and explain its motivation, contribution, and methodology. We discuss some of its limitations, the development of literature, and its connection to the literature on relational contracting with an observable effort cost. We suggest some open questions for the future development of the literature.

Keywords: limited commitment; relational contracts; risk sharing; limitedcommitment; relationalcontracts; risksharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 D86 J41 L14 M55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1628/jite-2023-0039

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