Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On
W. Bentley MacLeod and
James Malcomson
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2023, vol. 179, issue 3-4, 470-499
Abstract:
"Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly citedwork.We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract theory and practice.
Keywords: relational contracts; informal enforcement; legal enforcement; incentives; private information; relationalcontracts; informalenforcement; legalenforcement; privateinformation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D23 D82 D86 L14 L22 L23 L24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On (2023) 
Working Paper: Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment: thirty years on (2023) 
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DOI: 10.1628/jite-2023-0040
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