The Red Queen Paradox: A Proper Name for a Popular Game - Note

Elias Khalil ()

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 1997, vol. 153, issue 2, 411-415

Abstract: HOLM [1995] claims that the prisoners' dilemma story is dubious: Each prisoner may confess even when innocent. However, this apparent failing can be remedied. The story is dubious rather because it is already institution-bound (the trust which binds the prisoners) and, therefore, its range is limited. An alternative, institution-free story is the 'Red Queen Paradox' from Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. The Red Queen Paradox highlights the reason behind the familiar suboptimal outcome of competition. The reason ist not the lack of an enforcer but rather the character of property as non-exclusively owned which typifies competition.

JEL-codes: B40 C70 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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