University Governance and Academic Tenure: A Property Rights Explanation
Willam O. Brown
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 1997, vol. 153, issue 3, 441-
This paper provides an efficiency-based explanation for several features of university governance including academic tenure. In this model, tenure is part of a broader system of organizational governance where the non-profit status of the university requires faculty members to evaluate and monitor both university administrators and trustees. The nature of the employment contract provides the incentives for the faculty to behave as residual claimants. Tenure is necessary for faculty to be willing to assume the roles normally associated with ownership without fear or reprisal from trustees and administrators.
JEL-codes: G30 L31 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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