On the Employment Effect of Manning Rules

Juergen Jerger and Jochen Michaelis ()

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 1997, vol. 153, issue 3, 545-

Abstract: Manning rules specify the number of workers assigned to a machine or operation. If unions and firms bargain over manning rules (instead of only over wages), employment rises for a given capital stock. In this paper, we extend the analysis to endogenous capital formation. Our analysis suggests that a small positive employment effect can be observed at the firm level and - for values of the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital below unity - also at the aggregate level. Moreover, we address the issue of McDONALDS and SOLOW's [1981] conjecture, which states that manning rules and efficient contracts are close substitutes.

JEL-codes: J23 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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