Financial Systems and Corporate Governance: A Review of the International Evidence
Colin Mayer ()
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 1998, vol. 154, issue 1, 144-
The paper is an overview of international variations in financial systems and corporate governance. Traditional theories of the firm emphasize the importance of managerial incentives, disciplining and finance in corporate governance. The paper argues that these are not the fundamental distinguishing features of different financial systems. Instead, ownership and control emerge as displaying more substantial variations across countries. These differences are associated with the formulation, implementation and adaptation of corporate strategy. The insider systems of Continental Europe and Japan may be superior at implementing policies which involve relations with stakeholders. Outsider, Anglo-American, systems may be more responsive to change.
JEL-codes: G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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